to make it a success in transport; material and men—to the limit of our resources. I urged Unity of Command as an essential condition of success.

That the first experiment was not a success was unfortunate. The facts I have related will enable those who have perused the miserable tale of folly, bickering, jealousy, tactlessness and sullenness to distribute the blame for the failure to achieve a better result. Unity of Direction had to be post-poned until events compelled Generals to subordinate personal pride and national susceptibilities to the exigencies of a common cause in straits. It needed a greater disaster than the Nivelle disappointment to achieve this end. In spite of all that happened this offensive was for the British Army a distinct success—a much greater success than the Somme. It might have ended in a triumph had it been skilfully and resolutely exploited. But once more the " angels on horseback" had spoilt the feast.

Whether there was anything more to be gained by pressing on the attack which had commenced so auspiciously in our sector, was a question upon which I was not competent to express an opinion. I was strongly inclined to take the Petain view that nothing considerable could be achieved by continuing the offensive on any considerable scale. But I knew that other Members of the Cabinet were of a different

opinion, notably General Smuts, who had
Cabinet desire been sent over to ^a front by the Cabinet
offensives to report on ^e situation and who came
back from his visit to Headquarters persuaded the Western offensive was the only military
operation which was now open to us. I subsequently
found that the majority of the Members of the War